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1
on 4 December 1980, Mr MTGHEL tabled a motion for a resorution on
nuclear safety policy (Doc. t-668/80) in the European parliament pursuant
to Rule 25 of the old Rules of procedure.
On 9 and 12 February
motions for resolutions on
and (Doc. L-913/80 ) in the
and 14 of the old Rules of
On 15 December 1980,
referred these motions to
committee responsible.
1981, Mr COppIETERS and others tabled two
the nuclear accident in La Hague (Doc. l-g7T/g})
European Parliament pursuant to Rules 25
Procedure.
9 and 13 February 1981, the European parliament
the Committee on Energy and Research as the
on 20 January 1981, the committee on Energy and Research appointed
Mrs Anne-Marie LrzrN rapporteur. rt considered these motions at its
meetings of 24 september 198r, r0 November r9g1 and 2 December r9g1. At
its meeting of 2 December 1981, the comrnittee adopted the motion for a
resolution and explanatory statement by 22 votes to 5 with 3 abstentions.
Present: Mrs wAr,z, chairman, Mrs LrzrN, rapporteur, Flr BEAZLEY,
tlr GALVEZ (deputizing for lir pTNTAT), Mr CAPANNA, Mr cRouX, Mr I(. FUCHS
Mr GALLAND, Mr GHERGO, Mr HERMAN (deputizing for lvlr van ROMpUy),
IYlr K.H. HOFFMAN (dCPUtiZiNg fOr Mr }IULLER-HERMANN), Mr LTNKOHR,
Mr MARKoPouLos, Ivlr I'18o, Mr MoRELAND,t4rs pERy, Mr PETERSEN, Mr pRrcE,
Mr PROToPAPADAKTS (deputizing for lvlr pArsLEy), Mr puRvrs, Mr RINSCHE,
Mr RoGAr.r.A, Mr RocERs (deputizing tor Mr ADAM), Mr sABy (deputizing for
Mrs CHARZAT), Mr sAssANo, t{r scHMrD. Mr sELTGMAN, Mr VANDEMEULEBRoUCKE(deputizing for DITsBONINO), Mrs VIEHOFF (deputizing for tlr GALLAGHER), g,
Mrs WEBER (deputizing for Mr PERCHERON).
E
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The Committee on Energy and
Pari.iament the following motion
statement
A
Research hereby
for a resolution
submits to the European
together with explanatory
MOTION EOR A RESOLUTION
on European nuclear safety policy
Th€ Euroocan Pnr'l i =-^-+
- having regard to the motions for resorutions tabled pursuant to Rui.e 25(Doc. 1-658/80) and (Doc. I-B7O/gO) and Rule 14 (Doc. 1-913/gll of theold Rules of procedure,
- havrng regard to the report of its committee on Energy and Research(Doc. 1-852/8t',,
- having regard to its previous resolutions,
- report by Mrs wAr,z on community policy on the siting of nucrear powerstations, taking account of their acceptability for the population(Doc 
. 392/7 S)li
- report, by Mr NoE on the need for a comrnunity policy on the reprocessingof irradiated fuels and materials (Doc. 69/7A)\
- report by Mrs wAr'z on the draft council Resol.ution concernlng consurtationat Community level on the siting of power stationsr aDd on the proposalfor a council Regu,ation concerning the introduction of a communityconsultation procedure in respect of power stations^ rikely to affectthe territory of another Member State (Ooc. L45/7713i
- r:epor: by r{r TLAHTG on rneasures to be taken in connection with theremoval 0f racioactive waste as part of community energy policy andon the proposal from the commission of the European communities tothe Council for:
" a draft council resolution on the implementation of a communityplan of action prograrnme in the field of radioactive waste,
- a draft council decision on the setting up of a high-lever committeeof experts responsibre for assisting the commission in theimplementation of the plan of action in the field of radio-active
waste,
- a draft Couneil decision on the setting_up of an adfor the processing of irradiated nuclear fuels (Doc.
hoc committee
576/77 )4,
- report by Mr vERoNEsr on the proposal from the commission of theEuropean communities to the council for a decision adopting a programmeof research for the European Atomic Energy community on safety in therrnalwater reactors (indirect nuclear action) (poc. 4lt/7g)5,
5;
2o,
3o.r
4o.l
5o,r
\lo 
,
No.
No.
No.
e 28, 9 .2 .J-i ,1 5
c 125 , 9.6.I976
c I83, 1.8.).c77
c 85, 10.4.1979
c 296,11.12.1978
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.. report by l.lr FLAl.l-tG on Lhe proposal from the Commissior of:he Brropean
Conrmuni-.ics to the Council for a Decision adopting a programne concerning
the deconmissioning of nuclear power plants (Doc. 473/78)1,
- report by !{r VERoNESI on the proposal from the Commission of the European
Communitj-es to the Council for a decision adopting a research programme
for .-he European Atomic Energy Community on codes and standards for
fast breeder reactors (structural integrity of components) (ooc . 493/781 l,
- reporl by tlr IllTCtiELt, on the operation of the EUnATOiI inspectorute
wilh particular refercnce to the allocation of duties between the Corunission
of the European Communities, the Governments of the t4ember States and
the International Atomic Energy Authority in respect of the inspection
of fissile materials in the EAEC (Doc. 3/7g? ,
- -csolution by llrs WI-LZ and. Mr FLISIIG on :he acciden-- at the Threo t'tilo
Island nuclear povJer siation (Doc. SL/|g12,
- report by !1r GHERGO'on the proposal from tiie Conmission of the European
Comrnunities to the Council for a decision adopting a five-year research
and training programme (1980-1984) of the European Atomic Energy
Community in the field of biology-health protection (radiation protection
programme) (Doc . L-552/7g11
- report by lvlr SELIGMAN on the proposal from the Commisslon of the
European Cornmunities to the Council for a decision adopting a research
and development programne for the European Atomic Energy Community on
rhe pluronium cycle and its safety (1980-1984) (ooc. L-8L3/7gf,
- report by l{rs Von ALEMANN on the siting of nuclear power stations in
frontier regions (Doc. 1-442/8011
- report by Sir Peter VANNECK on a nuclear energy moratorium (Doc. I-49/8I) {
- having regard to the nuclear safety code of the Economic and Social Conrrittee;
- having regard to the communication from the Commission to the Council on
the technological problems of nuclear safety, third progress report
(coM(81) 213 final);
- havrng regard to the communication from the Comnission to the Councif on
the safety principles for light-water-reactor nuclear power plant
(CoM(81) 519 final);
roJ No. c 6, 8.f .Lglg
2oJ 
,,o . c 127, 2!.5.1g7g
3oJ No . c 34, rL.z.19Bo
4oJ rJo. c 147 , L6. 6 .1980
5oJ uo. c 327, L5.t2.1980
6o.r uo . c r44, 15.6. 1981
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having regard to the report
European Communities' by a
on 'nuclear safety in the context of thegroup of experts on nuclear safety (COM(SO) g0g fina]);
whereas an analysis of all situations which could l-ead to malfunctioning innuclear power stations is an essential reguirement for nuclear energy developmentwhich respects the basic principles of safeguard,ing pubric health and theenvironment;
whereas European nuclear safety
of workers and of the safety of
whereas the Community can play a
safety standards,
policy must take account both of the safety
the population at large,
role in encouraging the harmonization of
- whereas nuclear energy, as one of the sophisticated technologies of thetwentieth centutry, must be harnessed for the peaceful service of mankind forsociar and economic progress through efficient consurtation procedures forthe siting and operation of power plant ensuring the best available securityof workers and the population,
- whereas the problem of nuclear safety is a community issue and adequate sorutionshave to be found at corrununity leveI, while maintainlng efficiency and onlyrestricting the independence of the Member states to the extent that is unavoidabre,
- whereas the aim in this field is to create a unified nuclear safety zone in Europ€,
- whereas the aim in this field is the adoption of the best existing codes ofsafety practised by the signatory states of the rnternational Atomic Energy Agency,
1. Invites the Commission to back up its directive of 15July I9g0 on basicstandards with specific community instruments covering casual hrorkers,occupational illnesses resultlng from irradiation, methods of monitoringpopulation radiation doses and the principle of optimization, and, in thisl-ast area, to arrange for cooperation wlth workers, organizations;
2 ' Highlights the importance of present discussions by Member states for theimplementation of the EAEC Directive of 15 July J.gg0 on basic safety standardsi
3 ' Renews its belief that electricity undertakings in the community must investin nuclear power to the attainment of the Community,s 1990 Energy Objectivesand for the political and economic independence of Member states and theircitizens;
4 
' 
Encourages those l'lember states which have not yet invested in nuclearerectricity generating plant to examine the performance and experience ofelectricity undertakings in those Menber states which are lmplementing
nuclear energy prograrnmesi
5 ' considers that precise European standards specific to each type of reactorshould be devised under the supervision of the Commission, dealing directlywith the detailed asPects of the design, construction and operation of powerstations and their comPonents, which would enable an effective electronuclearpolicy to be rmplemented throughout the Community;
'7- PE 74.l|l/fin.
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1
10.
11.
6.
7.
8.
9.
L2.
Invites the Commrsslon to press for the implernentation in practice of its
recommendation of .16 November 1960 on the application of Artrcle 3? of
the Euratom Treaty;
Emphasizes the need to achieve speedy progress on criteria to harmonize
siting from the point of view both of safety and seismic conditions and of
the regui.rements for installations to be at a safe distance from civil and
military airports and all military targets in general, and to introduce a
democratj-c consultation and arbitration procedure, provided that this is
done efficiently and without delaying materially the attainment by each
I"lember state of indigenous energy self-sufficiency or the best possible
leveI of indigenous energy production;
Attaches considerable importance to the question of direct and indirect
rescarch on the Super-SARA project which should be given sustained support
and a regular allocation of budgetary appropriations;
Considers that the Commission should invite the Member States to compare
notcs on their nuclear emergency planning to permit the harmoni,zation of
basic criteria, a precise assessment of the invcstments needed and the
scope f or mu t u.rl at;s istatrcc ;
rnvites tlrt' govcrnrnent.s of the Mcmber st ates to preparc all thc rr;,fdr
hospital and telecommun:-caLions infrastructure needed for an emergency,
ProPoses that the Commission shoul.d seL up a European Infornation Servj.ce
to collate information on the operation of power stations in Europe and
elsewhere by means of appropriate agreements with the states involved
throughout the wor1d, analyse t-he data provided, carry out the technical
studies needed for the definition of standards, taking into account inter-
national initiatives already in progress and to coordinate the activities
of the Member States with a view to proposing, on the basis of information
obtained, appropriate measures to deal with breakdowns and to examine
whether computer analysis of breakdowns can serve the objectives of
improved safety, and to this end, wishes to see a first step made by
creating a Community legal instrument which would make it obligatory to
supply detailed informatron on unusual incidents; the second step should
be for this information and control service to act as the supreme European
authority as from 1 January 1983 by analogy with the European Association
for Cooperation and the Comrnission should submit proposals to this effect
in due course; this will ensure that all the relevant national bodies and
experts are involved in its work;
Notes that, given the long-term safety reguirements, it is desirable, in
the Iight of current industrial applications and the special risks involved,
that the processing of irradiated fuels and waste storage should be subject
to harmonized standards;
('a11s on the Commission to draw up a report on the problem posed in safety
terms by thc Arowing amounts of nuclear waste accumulating within the
Community;
r3.
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14. Ca1ls on the Commission to draw up a report on the applicatron of the
IAEA 50 c-G code by the Member States to permit direct monitoring by
public bodies;
15. Asks the Comrnission and Member States to verj.fy that eLectrrcrt,y under-
takings include the cost of contingent decommissioning of power stations
in the price charged for electricity and that thls cost should be shown
transparentLy in the electricity tariff srructurei
16. Considers that the concept of a unified safety zone which it favours
would involve:
(a) regulatory measures to enable a full range of Community standarr.ls
to be drafted for the protection of workers, the population and
the environment from nuclear radiation; this would include more
comprehensive directives on basic standards (dlrect exposure and
, exposure from waste), Community instruments relating to the
prevention of accidents and the accidental release of radioactive
, 
substances, the dismantling of contaminated installations and waste
storage; regulatory measures covering al1 action in Eransfrontj-er
regions in the event of accidents;
(b) coordinated administr;rtrvc measures to alJow the Member states to
carry out their three-fold task of 
.gg!Iorl-?9.!lglr., rcaulat.ion and
sup_e_rvisi.on; more attention needs to be given in future to cooperation
between the rwo sides of industry;
(c) [!r9-9Irc!$II] research on
compar i son of t.ho var ious
or treatmeni- bdsed on the
analysis;
react()r safety and the fuel cycle; a
systems. ancl diffcrent, methods of proeessing
rnost advanced methods of accident risk
(d) institutj-onal measures to strengthen the Commission services and to
set up an information service (data bank, technical advice, coordination
of action in the event of serious accidents);
L7. Emphasizes that safety requirements, the need for which is beyond dispute,
should not bccomc a pretext for hindering the deveLopment of nuclear
energy in cascs where this is essential, i.e. where it enables the
Community to reduce its excessive dependence on third countries for
hydrocarbon fuels; reaffirms that one of the basic aims of the Community's
energy straLegy is to reduce raprdly its dependence on oi1 as has also
been noled by the Commissj.on of the European Communrties in its Communication
to the Councrll of I ocr,ober 1981 on the llandate of 30 D'tay which sf,6r-es
rThe devel"opmcnE. of nuclear energy is vital to ensure security of energy
supply and orrc of the main ways of reducing dependence on oilt;
The development of an energy strategy for the Community (COM(81) 540 final)
-9 PE 74.l1L/fin.
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18.
19:
eonsiderF that interp,qElon3l eggpeFqtign iE ngt only useful for the
eIcFFfrgF of gcientific l(Bgylgdge bUt pan SlgP glay an effective and
Vttgi fgle i4 5psponflrng tg Ehe widespreed need to reasFure pubrrc
oBi4igp qf Fhg lrigh ievel qf eefety in the nucfear onergy industpy,
pafFlFurAfiy feletiye ro qEfety levelS in othsr industri4l sectopp,
qpq Ep wi.n the confidenFe Qf those qectiong of pUblic opipion whrch
qre egqostlg of anpagonistic tp Ehe peacsftll uEe of nucleer technology;
Insgrgcls iLs prgsrflent tp fgfwefd this fesO'IUtion and the report by
+ts ggnqitFFe tP thF Cgrancil errd the Coln$isgisn and to the Presidente
"f lhF patignql Pa5lianentg fef the infofnaEiQn of their specialist
cqnim+ttFg:.
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BEXPLANATORY STATEMENT
I - INTRODUCTION
1. The European Atomic Energy community has not been able to prevent
its Member states deveroping d,ifferent , and in some cases divergent,
nuclear poricies. This was no ,doubt inevitabre given the technical
links betvreen military nuclear applications and non-miLitary nuclear
applicatlons and the influence of options in one on the other.
2. Looking back over the last twenty years, we find that reactor
1safety- and the protection of workers, populations and the environ-
ment did not pray a decisive rore in the initial choices of nucrear
systems.
3. Be that e.s it may, times have changed and the conmunity is now paying
more and more attention to nuclear safety and protection. safety has
become a right and must play an integral part in any decisions in the
nuclear fie1d. The Parliament considers that there is a need for discussions
t.o define and improve the methods of integrating this highly-sophisticated
twentieth-century technology into a democratic process; of control.
The idea of a European nuclear safety area, a unified nuclear safetv
zone, is-.gaining ground given the scale of the responsibiLities and the
difficulty of the tasks facing Lhe Member States in a fleld to which
public opinion has become highLy sensitive.
4. Gradually, therefore, but too slowly, the use of nuclear pcrwer in
Europe for non-military purposes is transcending nationalism and t.he
sectarian policies of itsearlydays. Superph6nix i{asonly possible
because of a joint European effort and its future will therefore be
European. The question which everyone is asl<ing now is whether this
prototype will remain unique or whether it will tead to a series of
fast breeder power stations which wiII require an enormous reprocessing
industry to supply plutonium. This debate has begun at rhe same time
1
-The term'safety' is nowadays normally only used to refer to the range
of measures taken to avoid accidents or incidents while the term
'security' relates to measures to prevent arms proliferation, misuse
of fissionable materials, sabotage, etc. The term accident is usedto describe any event caused by or causing a breakdown or malfunctioning
which could lead to a higher level of exposure to radiation than thatinvolved in normal operations (definition from the safety of the nuclearfuel cycle AEN OECD, May 1981)
-11. - PE 74.051/fin.
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I
in alr the l4ember states and it will no doubt be at national 1evelthat the decisions wilr be taken. But this does not preclude aEuropean debate on the whole safety issue or measures being takenat this level to ensure that every technical system used now orin future in Europe provides the optimum protection for workers, thepopulation and the environment.
5. Although the environmentalists had done a great dear of the
ciroundwork it took the accident at rhree Mile rsland to generate a
::r:rr' feerinv of concern. rn rhis respect rhis incidenr was high,yrnstructive. -
6 - while some people emphasize the fact that there was no loss oflife and 1itt1e contamination, others note that the least hazardous
and most reliable nuclear system was nevertheless involved in what maybe described as a serious incident because the ctadding of a secti-onof the core melted and released fission products.
7. At all events this incident reveated certain weaknesses in theNuclear Regulat.ay commission which had after arl been considered
exemorary as an organization for nuclear safety because it coveredthe three major functions of specifying standards, licensing and
monitoring and was represented on the site of every povrer station.This accident emphasized the need for a sufficient quantity of gualifiedtechnical personnel to be permanently present on the site and from
now on this should be included in any discussion of the applicationof safety standards- There were weaknesses even at the level 0fequipment design and shortcomings in routine management were revealedby the fact that those responsible had a110wed the power station tooperate during a period in which the emergency pumps had been removedand later these were rei-nstal1ed without checking that the var.ves hadbeen reopened.
8' Given this accumulation of human error and technicar faults,
some incline to the view that the fact that there was no r_oss of lifeshows how the dangers of pwR nuclear power stations have been exaggerat.ed.others, like :he raPporteur conclude th&. the public authorities have taken farfewer precautions than they thought. And that Europe must learn fromthis experience!
lortnounn t"J.iirrury rittle attempt has been made to analyse the accidentswhich have occurl:a,.particuliii'ir.r.o*- tr,e poirt of v1ew of post_accidentcontrol procedures, important stirdies h""; ;;;; carried out into thecauses and likelihood of potential acciaentsi-trrJ'most important of thesesrudies was the RAsMUssEN (wASH iaool .;a;;a-rr,iJr., has beln i"ii"r,_,rp nyvarious national organizatior," una aaaptEa-i"";;;i. specific circumsrancesimention should also be made of trre r,o.i proie"i in trr. united stateswhich showed that the .""urnpiion".g.n"ruify-aaopied for LocA (Ioss_of_coolant
:;:it:lli]";:I: particula.rv p"""i,ii"ti.-[i,.*iJI"it"a i., s.""i"i Iarery
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9. Compared with limiting the radiation to which human beings are
exposed and the radiatiot from radioactive waste released into the en-
vironment during ncrmal- running, the prevention of major accidents has
assumed an importance which it did not have before Tl'1I, although earlier
accidents had also been studied. The danger of major accidents of a
d,ifferent kind (chemical explosions and fires) which could affect
installations reprocessing nuclear fuels, was highlighted onl-y this
year in Europe. This is a further reason for this heightened awareness.
10. Good-neighbour relations between the Member States o.e the Community,
which is one of the main raisons d'6tre of EuroPe, are also an important
aspect because many of the power stations are close {:@ frontiers or
located on rivers or coasts with other l{ember States downstream. The
accidental release of radioactive substances could seriously affect
neighbouring countries.
11. Idealty, basic standards relating to waste produced by normal
functioning and specific standards under Article 124 relating to the
safety of reactors and installations should be given the same mandatory
Community status because both thelre areas are equally important.
And in the same way as the commission explicitly claims the right
under the Treaty to be informed of the level of radiation and to check
the effica<:y of the steps taken by the Member States Lo measure this,
it should also seek to exploit to the fu}| its legal instruments, in-
cluding the use of Article 203, Lo ensure that national systems of
accident prevention and the supervision of instaltations r:ffectively
ensure adherence to European safety standards.
L2. Only Ehe Member States are empowered to license nuclear installations
and organize supervision of their operation. But if Europe is to become
the unified safety zone which we Propose, their freedom of decision,
particularly in relation to the choice of tocation, must be accompanied
by an agreement on consultation and arbitration procedures'
13. In this respect precautions wiII have to be taken to prevent volun-
tary or imposed silence on the part of those responsible and the
European nuclear zone will have to become more transparent. Ivlore than
any other applied science, nuclear technology was developed under
conditions of secrecy. A conspiracy of silence has the lvorst possible
effects for producers of electricity and the population because it
surrounds the entire fietd of nuclear activity with an air of mystery.
In fact the knowledge that public supervision exists is Iikely to
benefit a]l those concerned. OnIy such public supervision and the
-13 PE 14.051/ fin.
independence which it would guarantee to the experts, can provide
a guarantee of objective analysis. Critical analysis of malfunc-
tioning and its causes can help improve standards and remove the
causes of accidents. Covering up or an exaggerated sense of dis-
cretion can only hinder this process.
14. Critical analysis may of course lead to conflicts of views
between the technical experts in differents national institutions
or between national and European technical experts. There are those
who wish to avoid such conflicts but I am sure that Parliament shares
the view that they si:ould be regarded as useful since they can lead
to clearness of thinking, greater care, and greater confidence in
the precautions taken and the monitoring systems employed.
15. The permanent nature of the risks involved in long-life isotopes
mean that nuclear pollution is virtually irreversible in a way that
other types of pollution are not, except in the case of a small
number of virtually non-degradable chemical substances. These risks
which affect enormous sections of the bir-rsp6sas for a very long
period of time cannot be taken lightly.
16. The contamination of sites, the permanence of the waste and
the possible need for management and monitoring even after it has
been duly treated and buried, are the price which must be paid by
the actual user of atomic power, his successors and future generations.
l'7. Limited liability companies can disappear without leaving any
chargeable assets. The public authorities are therefore tikely
to become responsible for long-term obligations or debts. The various
llember States have embarked upon a massive use of atomic power without
having taken any steps in advance to resolve the technological,
f inancial or legal- problems of w.:ste. Tn insuranr:e t.oo, ttre increase
in the risks involved is creating problems tor which no proper solution
has yet been found.
18. The Member States would be well advised to work together,as
they are already dolng in the technological fiel-r:1, to find parallel
or joint 1ega1 and financial solutions. They should also expand
and speeC up joint or coordj-nated technical research j-nto nuclear
waste treatment and storage. This is a matter of urgency because
the volume of waste requiring treatment is growing fast.
19. These are the main subjects dealt rcith 1n the major sections
of this report on the organization of non-military nuclear safety
in Europe. It does not include the problems of political security
and, in particular, the risks attaching to the misuse of nuclear
materials or politically motivated attacks on nuclear installations
which faII wiLhin a different sphere.
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20. It is time for Parliament to invite: the Council and the Commission
not only to make more general and more comprehensive use of their
powers untler the Treaties br-rt arso to call on the Member states
Eo coordinate more closery their criteria for the choice of sites,
systems, and waste treatment methods. None of the Member states
can escape the consequences of decisions by its neighbours. Experience
l:as shown that no oile can dispense witlr t}:e scientific expertise
of others w;ren it comes to solving nuclear safety problems. our
community instruments therefore need to be improved and strengthened
to creaLe this 'unified nuclear safet.y zone,.
2r. This explanatory statement sh()'.vs '.he varj-ous actions whrclr
the European Institutions can and should undertake to :
- ensure a uniform and optimum Level_ of protection not
only for workers in nuclear installations but also
for the population and the environment against the
ri-sks of radiati-on from nuclear activities.
- tc coordinate the various safety aspecr s invol_ved in the
pro<iuction of nuclear energy.
- to strengthen the role of the European organizations among
al.t the institutions ar.d organizations responsible for nuciear
safety in Europe.
rI 
- COMMUNITY ACTION IN TI{E TIELD OF fuqDIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
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22. The importance of the rore assigned by the authors of the Euratom
Treaty to the Community in the field of radiological protection is shown
by the fact that one of t.he principal tasks entrus'ted to the Community
is the establishrnent of 'uniform safety standards to protect,che health
of workers and of E.he general public and ensure that they are appried'(Article t(b) ).
23- The basrc EURATOI'I standards therefore clearly constitute the basis
and cornerstone of European poricy in the ma.Eter of radiol_ogical pro-
tecti-on; accordi-ng to the definltions given in t:he EUILqToI4 Treaty, tire
basic standards are (Article 30):
(a) maximum permissible doses compat.ibre vuith adequat.e sar-.ety;(b) maximum permissrble levers of exposure and cont.aminationi(c) the fundamental principles governing the health surveillance
of worl<ers.
- 
15 
- PE'14.05l,/fin.
24 ' The basrc stanciards <lcfine the principles and maximum perrnittedlevels.f cxposure to radiation for the general public and workers.These are based on the rcRp recommendations. rn its ru[]jgationNo. 26 cf 7tt77, the rcRp set out a ner,, system of standards based
on three principles.
1. No projects involving exposure to racriation shour_d be implemented
unless they produce a positi-ve net benefrt;
2. Al-i exposure to radiation shourd be kept at the towest leve1
reasonably possible heving regard to social and economic factors;
3 - rr.divrdual equrvalent doses should rroL ext:eed the rirnits re_
commended for any specific case;
rn other words, dny proced.ures invoh,-ing potentially dang..:rurrs
suhstailcc- lr equil-rment, sucrr a1 radiation, reguire advance justification
wit'h a cost-benefit anaiysis. This goes beyond radiolcqical pro-tec'Lion rn its nar-row sense but requires aspects of radiologicalprotecLion to be t-aken into account.
A"y proceciurc justified in social t.erms needs to be applied
-in such a way as to optimize protection.
some of t,:ese ideas were taken up in the most recerrt versior.
of crre directi-ve on basic standards adopted by the councir- on15/7/i9Bo. 'r'his f inal version is in;r,rcquate particurarry because:
1 ' Art:-cle 6 makes rro reference to the rcRp 26 criterion of havrng
regard to social and econom-ic aspects and also fails to take
accounr of the important aspect of optimization.
l' Article 5 prorzides a loophole for ttre unjustified use of tech-
nology involv.inq radiation.
These two prrnciples had gener;r.ed considerable c.;.!imism ini ite ICRP because they providc+,j ni,re comprehensive protecti-on andr framework for nt-gotiations with workr:rs.
Examples of sh rtcomings:
- the pf:rmitted o :e for p.regnant women is particularly high airdthe methoc.l for c-al_culating the dose is inadequate;
- lhe number of workers monitored individuarly will decline because
only workers 1n the A cat.egory (over 1.5 m rem) are to continue
rc recej.r'e me(r car surveillance. A definition based on categories
o.' wo,rk would have beerr r:ore useful;
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- the problem of temporary and casudl workers has been ignored;
a special poricy of information and prevention shourd have been
designed for theru and for migrant wo::kers and workers in thetransport sector;
- Article 45 estabrishing controls by the inspectio, services in
respect, of the dose limits nakes no reference to crrecks onjustifiability or optimization (Article 6 a and b).
occupationar diseases, the coveragie of risks attaching to these
and radiologicar prot:ection are not covered by any specific instrument
or any article in the directive. This is a major omission.
25' The areas of application of the basic standards adopteQ by theCouncil of l4inisters goes beyond. major nuclear installations; it coverspractically aII activities _ production, processing, handling, use,hording, storage, transport and disposal of haturar and'artificialradioactive substances invorving radiation or contamination rishs forworkers or the general pubric and includes the use of isotopes inhoepitals and of raa.ioltgy in food production.26. In addition to legal powers of monitoring and control to ensureobservance of the basic standards by the Member states, the commissionhas technical powers enabling it to monitor and limit the developmentof the radiological risk within the European Comrnunity; parlLament, 
.lgkes the view that the conmission and the Member states have hi.,rertounderestimated these poqrers"
(u) 
,(o) 
_
ment and the soil.
( a ) Supervisorv
--s--:=-==i- e!g_89!r!9+!g_p9g9r9_i!_ lbc- grepggel_9r_regrgeg!_ryggeglg (Articte 32)
27- one particurar supranationar means of action designed to limit
radiological contamination of the environment in the ttember States isgiven to the commission by Articre 37 of the EURATOI.{ Treaty. This
article directry forms part of the basic standards of EUBATQM' and
stipulates that: tEach I'lember State shall provide the Commission with
such general dat.a rerating to any plan for t.he disposar of radioactive
waste in trhatever form as will make it possible to detergine whether the
implementation oi such a pran is liable to result in the radioactive
contamination of the water, soir or air space of another i{ember state.
The Commission s!:all deliver the opinion
after consulting the group of experts referred
within six months,
tc irr Article 3I.'
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28. Having been drawn up at a time when nuclear energy lras still
in its carly sLages, the EURATOM Treaty was imprecise in a nurnber
of praces. rt is not surprising that Articre 37 has raised a number
of dj fficulties of interpretation and that a number of establisfrments
have <'scaped the provisions. over the years the area of application
of Article 37 shourd have been extr-:nded arthough it has generarly
been seen by the l{ember states as a dangerous inst.rument and threat
to the:i .r powers. parriament believes that this Articre 37 shourd
be backed up without deray by an up-dated recommendation setting
out the minimum requirel',.nt-s for impact assessments and safety reports.
one commission recommendation of 16 November 1960 on the appli-
cation of'Articre 3? which has since become inadequate, specified:l
- which activities are
active vraste;
considered to invotve the disposal of raOio-
that the handling or temporary storage of radioactive waste is not
considered as'disposal' ;
- what is meant. by 'general data' in Article 37;
- that the general dat.a shall be 
.orovided at least six months before
the date envisaged for implementation of the plan.
29. The rist of generar data to be piovided was revised in 1973
and needs further revi-sion as a matter of urgenr:y given that itis now inadequate. The revision shourd also incr_ude the area ofthermal rdaste. The monj_tori_rg of effective adherel,, e to the recommendertions
made in opir-i..rns n( eds to be organized and measurement technigues
harmonized.
-Procedure now:
' ?he secretariat draws up for the group of experts a study of theproposed radioactive waste and its maximum foreseeabre consequences.This study is forwarded to the experr:s to provide a basis for discussionat the meeting when the proposal is examined. Re1:resentatives of theMember state which submitted the plan are called to this meeting toprovide any clarification or further details reguired.
The experts submit a report to the commission giving their.verdicton 
-the disposar project and its foreseeabre consequences and, wherenecessary, on any ancirlary aspects affecting the safety of the generarpublic, particularly as regards transfrontier cooperation. On the basisof this report, the secretariat draws up a draft opinion which is sub_mitted for the approval of the Commission.
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'rhe group of experts is in the process of putting the finishing
touches to a method of calculaticn to provide a standarrl
of ar.sessing the radiol.ogical consequences of an accident involving
a loss of primary coorant which could occur in a water reactor.
This method should allow concrusions to be drawn which do not depend
on the dif ferent methods used by the Ivlember States.
30. It is wrong that one Member State (Belgium) stilI granLs per-
mission to build without requiring a preliminary safety analysis.
The revised form of the recommendation on the application of Article
37 should condemn such practices and seek to charige them.
31. The documents and safety reports drawn up under Article 37
are in some cases crassified information. rn America any citizen
or association is allowed to study such reports and if necessary
to have a second assessment made. rn Europe, the confidentiarity
rule should no longer apply to these documents.
(b) Powers in relation to !!e-89!i!9E1[e-9!-9!y]re!tre!! ll reg]9s9!ty]!y
32. The Euratom Treaty provides expressty in Artrcle 35 rr.at
each l{ember state sha11 estabLish the facirities irecessary i-o measure andmonitor the leve1 of radioactivity. The est.ablishment of such a monitoring
system and the actual monitoring of the radioactivity in the environmentis primariry a matter for the t,Iember states. since the purpose of thesefacilities is arso to checr< that the Euratom basic standards are being
observed, the Commisslon hae.been given bhe,r,igtre to veryj"Glr..the operat.i_on
and efficiency of such facilities (Ariic.1e 35).. National and su"oranational
measures therefore complement one another to ensure the monitoring of
radioactivit.y. in the environment. since r959 t.he commission has been
making use of its right to verify the measuring facilities, in order t.obring about quicl<Iy some degree of harmonization of measurement
'techniques in the t4ember States, to establish comrnon units of measurement
and thus to improve the comparabitity of results. There is, however,
ample scope for greater harmonization of monitoring procedures
I{ithin a maximum of six months from the noLification of the project,
the opinion is sent to the lqlember State which has submitted the project
and to the l{ember states which may be affected by the proposal.
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33' The effe'ct'iveness of supranational measures in bhe field of environ-merlt<Il raclioactivicy monrt'oring arso depends however on rapid availabilityof aLl the rneasured results from t,he various Mem.ber St.ai:es; ArticLe 36of the Euratom ?reat1' therefore makes it compulsory for the approprrate
. nati-onaf authorities to rnform the commission regularly of the leveI 0fradioactivity; only if it l<nows precisely the level of radioactivltyin the envj-ronment and the food. cycle, its causes and its componencs,wii-1 the Conmission be in a position to take measures, if necessary, rEoiorevent j'nfringement of the basic standards and to ensure compriance withregulations' 
.
34 ' tt is important to remember that the ArARA standards specify minrmumlevel-s of protection rather than an ideal.. parriament therefore cannotaccept that action can only be taken once a crisis has beerr reached.The rcRp 26 document outlined a more flexible basis for action whichmight usefully be adopted. In parallel, as it were, to these pcl\rersof technicar- and regislative contror, considerabre imporr-ance is a-tachedto standardizing measuring techniguc.s ancr rmproving trrr., aesults toensure radiological protection. rn such areas a supranational organizationsuch as EURATOM could and should be involved in radiometry as a coordinat-rng agency; as regards Lhe monitoring of environmental radioactivity,the problem ries less in the administrative problems of expeditingtransmission to the commission by the nationar bodies responsible of theinformation obtained than in the rerative inaccuracy of the measuringtechni'ques themselves arthough they are in fact more sensitive thanchemical 0r physicaf measurements; the inaccuracy of equipment and measure_
'nent techniques reduces the value of the information received. Althoughthe commissj-on 1s making every effort in cooperation with the responsibrenationar" authorrties and rescarch laboratories to improve techniq'escontinua'r-Iy, not enough progress has been madc, and further ef forts toharmonize monitoring should be made and include sampring techniques andthe stancl.:.rdization of methods.
( c ) !e99s5sb-t!!9_rsg_lelggleel_preleg!rsl
35' The third vital element, in addit.ion to the worl< of standardizatron
and technical administration by the communit:y in the fierd of radiorogicalprotection is the 1:romotion and coordination of research into this subject.The terms of reference for Euratom research into radj.oiogical protection
and i:adiobiology is defrned in the EURATOI4 Treaty; the research sectorsinvolved are:
(1) study of the detection and measurement, of harmful radi_ations;(2) study of adequate prevenLive and protective measures and the apFro_pri.a'te safety standards;
(3) study of the treatment of radiation effects.
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Although little headway has been made
considerable progress has been achieved in
in the first two areas,
relation to treatment.
l,it,,' This list indicated the general objectives for EURATOI,I in the field
of research into radiological protection. Its efforts were not to be
concentrated on the promotion of fundamental research but, on the contrary,
were to'.iuake a concrete and scientific contribution to improving the
practical aspects of radiological protection. EURATOI4 research in this
area l-s therefore directly related to the regulatory activity 6f tho
Community ln the field of radiological protection.
37'. The research progranmes carried. out by the Community in this sector
qince 1958 have adhered to this principle; they are designed to expand
scientific and technical knowledge in order to determine the maximum
admisslble values for human irradiation and contamination of the environ-
ment and to improve the practical organization of radiological protestion
in the Member States.
38.
the
on
The research carried out as Part of
field of radiological protection and
the following sectorg:
the multiannual programmes in
biology has concentrated mainly
(]) research into the effects of radiation on living beings, their pre-
vention and treatmenti
l2l improvements to radiological measurement eguipment and development
of new equipment;
(3) research into the application of methods of radiological treatment in
agriculture and the preservation of food products;
(4) development of nuclear processes in medical research.
39. In retrospect it can be seen that the EURATOM research programme
into radiologiciiJ- protection has been practically untouched by the latent
crisis which has been affecting EURATOM research for many years, so that
its efficiency, which can only be guaranteed by a degree of continuity,
has been assured.
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40. However, the progress on safety achieved so far in the nuclear energy
sector must be increased in the future, since the energy situation, as
modified by the oil- crisis of 1973, will not be the onry reason for in_
creaslng work on radiological protection.
4L- ?he growing use of nuclear energy, the increase in its peaceful
applications and ccrrrseguently in the number of potential sources of
radiation or contamination means that the measures for prevention and
monitoring in the field of radiological protection wilr have to be
strengthened lnfuture to limit. possible risks.
III . REACTOR SAFETY
A - 
::i::1:::i"n of safety rechniques and srandardization of equipmenr
42. rhe counc,,:" ,"=";.; 
"; :;:::;;;;; ": .;. ;"";",";;..; ;;,._"of nuclear safety is an inadeguate basis for work in this field because,
although it polnts out the importance of coordinating nationar safety
reguirements and criteria, it does not furnish the means.
Harmonization of safety criteria and standards is essential both for
well-tried types of reactor (mainly heavy water reactors) and for advanced
tlpes of reactor (mainly sodium-coored fast breeder reactors). parliament
takes the view that comnunity action has been inadequate in relation to bothtypes of reactor and also regrets that there has been no comparatLve study
of the risks of the different systems on a conrmon basi-s.
Steps should be taken
to draw up reconmendations on general safety principles on the basis offundamental radiological protection principles, in particular byincluding the concept of risk in safety analyses and applying risk
analysis,
However, in addition and above all it is necessary:
- to draw up specifLc recommendations
EURATOM Treaty.
pursuant to Article t24 of the
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to apply Articte 203 to safety, if necessary by extending the scope for
Community measures.
1. !ls!95-E9eg!9EE
s-
For several
.rarmonization of
::eactors.
years the Commission
the technical safety
n." 1..r, carrying out progressive
reguirements and criteria for water
The purpose is to ensure a uniform level of protection for the general
public and the workers concerned on both sides of frontiers, contributing
;rt the same time to the elimination of technical barriers hnd the opening
r>f the intra-Community nuclear market. Furthermore, the links which exist
l>etween harmonization at Community level and harmonization within a wider
-nternational framework (such as the IAEA and the ISO) help extra-Community
::rade and the export of both complete nuclear power stations and components.
The principal areas covered by this action are theoretically as
7follows:
- comparison of the practices and criteria used for the protection of
nuclear power stations and analysis of accident conditions;
- study and comparison of the practices, rules and standards used in the
siting, design and construction of nuclear power stationsi
-,studies on the training and qualifications of control room operators;
- assessment of risk in safety analyses;
- assessrnent of the systems of notification of accident and incidents
occurring in nuclear power stations.
lA 
,"rkrrg p"rty (wp No. r) on water reactor safety covering methodology,
criteria and standards consisting of representatives of the licensing
aut.horities ana/oi- 
"iiety organiiations and inspectorates, 
electricity
producers (UNIpE;E) and iranuiacturers (UNICE) (pfus a representative
of CEEP)
- a working party (WP No. 2) on research into water reactor safety with
the sane membersirip as the above grouP plus.rePresentatives from the
authoritie" re"ponlible for the aalninisiration of research prograrunes'
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43. Only the first stage, consisting in the exchange of information,
the listing of methods, criteria and standards used in the different
Member States has been completed, and the lists have to be periodically
revised to take account of the highly dynamic nature of the technological
pr6blems of nuclear safetY.
On the other hand the Community has become bogged down far too long
at the second stage of identifying the simil-arities and differences and
analysing the reasons behind these without progressing to the active
stage of designing instruments.
Although work has begun internally on the third stage of drafting
Comnunity recommendations, nothing concrete has yet emerged. Far from
prooucing European standards, this step-by-step procedure has simply
delayed the process while over the same period the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) has been producing codes and guides, some of which
have immediate practical appJ-ications.
In the course of 1981, a of safetY
in nuclear power stations is J-ike1y to be completed and could serve as
a basis for more specific Community recommendations. Parliament takes
the view that both the Commission and the Council should immediateJ-y
progress beyond the stage of discussion and proPose and adopt suitable
instruments (ArticIes L24 and 203).
Although the document on safety principles is an essential pre-
requisite, it is important to proceed without deJ.ay to the establishment
of specific standarde and, in particular, to abandon formalistic inventorieE
and comparisons of national standards. Instead of being listed and studied
for their inherent interest, the similarities and differences between
national standards should serve as approaches to the only real.J.y con-
structive goal: the creation of European standards.
2. Ie9!-E9e9!9!9
44. Community action relates to the coordination of national- research
prograrnmes and the harmonization and elaboration of criteria, codes
and technical- standards retating to this type of reactor and its principal
comFonents. In this fie1d, the research aspects dealt with under D(b) and
policy aspects are closely linked.
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45. The harmonization measures relate more specifically to the drawing up of
criteria and preliminary technical recommendations, a comparison of the
design codes applied to certaj-n accident hypotheses, the possibilities offered
by recent devel-opments in microelectronics in relation to the control and
protection of fast reactors, the exchange of information and know-how and
the coordination, with Community financial participation, of research con-
ducted by the Member States, the harmonization of national codes and standards
for the production (design, manufacture and quality control) of the struc-
tural components of fast reactors in order to ensure a common level of
structural integrity and to eliminate the technical obstacles to the ex-
pansion of a nuclear market.
46. The principal results obtained so far include the following: i
- drafting of preliminary technical recommendatlons and criteria for
accj,dents arising in the core or the primary circuit of the reactori
- comparative calculations with design codes developed by different
Member States for hypothetical loss of coolant flow accidents and
transient power surges in an irradiated reactor coret
- comparison and validation of the design codes for assessment of the
effects of severe accidents on the primary containment systems and
certain componentsi
ITh"." activities were conducted by two working parties of the Fast Reactor
Coordinating Committee:
1. Wesbils-perlv-9!-!e9!-E9ee!9r-9eEe!v
Set up for the purpose of exchanging information on research and
development programmes and Progress, proposing action to be
undertaken to resolve problems and preparing colnmon safety criteria-
2. EetE!Bs-Pqr!v-e!-ee4el-cs9-s!ellqslqs
of which the principal purpose is to draw up a list of the existing
codes and standards which may be applied to fast reactors in order
to identify areas where further information is desirable.
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B. Siting of nuclear power stations
47. The Commission has to standardize the practices and safety criteria
applied in the selection and development of power station sites.
48. The choice of sites must be subject to the approval of the elected
bodies and the public, ensuring in particular the publication of those
parts of the safety reports which do not present any'problems of patent
rLghts. In the Community, in particular, there arises the very difficult
problem of sites with a high population density or those situated in
industrial areas because of the risks associated with large-scale
evacuatj-on in the event of even a minor a ccident, or effects on the
safety of nuclear install-ations caused by conventional installations
(chemical works, petroleum plants, gas transporti risks of fire or ex-
plosion). This problem, which is connected with certain proposats for
sites near frontsiers, cal1s for particular attention at Community level.
49. The measures taken and the proposals regarding the choice of sites
do not relate specifically to nuclear power stations but faII within the
wider context of the sitlng of power stations in general.
50. Pursuant Lo the Council resolution on energy and the environment of
3lviarch 1975, the Commission has undertaken to promote'"the exehange of ''
information on the planning and siting of new power statj-ons as part of a
progranme of action on thermal discharges. With the aid of a-group of
national experts a list has been drawn up of the various practices used
in the selection of sites in the Community.
51. The consultation provided for in Articl-es 41 and 42 of the EAEC Treaty
can only be effective and play a part in the choice of sites if it is in-
cluded in a long-term planning of nuclear development. The three-month
deadline specified serves 1itt1e purpose and the Commission should take
steps to amend this deadline and to progress towards an effective poJ.icy
on prograrnmes as provided for in Chapter 4 of the EAEC Treaty.
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52. Following a report by the European Parlianent ton the conditions for
Conuounity policy on the siting of" nuclear power stations taking account
of their acceptability for the population' lDoc- 392/75), the Connnission
submitted two Proposals to the Council:
- a proposal for consultation at Connunity level on the siting of power
stations. Such consultation should lead to the development of comon
criteria for the selection of sites, particularly for power stations in
border areas and power stations sited alongside international watersi
- a proPosal for the introduction of a Conmunity consultation procedure
for pourer stations likely to affect the territory of other Menber States(frontier power stations).
53. In 1978 the council adopted the proposal for consultation in a form
which limits such action to the exchange of information and know-how on
the choice of sites.
54. A group of experts from the member countries rdas set up following the
council decision and their work has reached a point at which a general
report is being completed.
55. In 1978 the Commission re-submitted to the Council its proposal for
a consultation procedure for frontier power stations. This proposal is
currently stilI being discussed by the CounciI.
c. ItEerse!i9!g-egeEee!sr-plenlisg- ee9-egcgsgssr-EgeqgrgE-is-!!e-cvcg!-9!-sg
slses3I-i!etqes!-er-essi ges!
55. Many types of accident of different degre€s of seriousness may affect
a nuclear site. The range extends from minor faults in inst,allations or
minor incidents involving exposure to radioactivity or to radiation, to
accidents causing extensive damage in the installation and the release of
radioactivity from the site, including serious faults causing substantial
damage in the installation or serious exposure of personnel.
In the event of unusual incidents (which in most cases do not require.
emergency plans to be implemented) it is essential for there to be an
extremely rapid exchange of information.
ThecreationofaraPidands.@,Systemfortransmittin9
information on unusual incidents vrith possible rePercussions on nuclear
rnstallations and associated operations will enable the scale and the
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' 
. :,
radiological, health and technological consequences of incidents to be
assessed and provide information which may reduce the risk of such
incidents recurring.
Work is currently in progress in the Comuission on a draft Council
regulation setting out a procedure for exchangi-ng information on unusual
incidents with possibLe repercussions on nuclear instal_rations and
their operations and Parliament hopes that this work wilr lead to
concrete results in the near future.
Responsibility for this information shoul-d farl within the terms of
reference of the European information and control service.
57. The national emergency plans must be harmonized so as to be able to cope
with all these situations. They must be designed to:
- Iimit the damage in the installation
- ensure protection of site personnel
- ensure the protection of the public around the site.
58. the basic functions of emergency planning are:
1. Providing assistance to the management of the installation by highly-
qualif ied speciiliSts.
2. Shutting down the installation in complete safety, continuous heat re-
moval and continued operation of the rest of t.he site in complete safety.
3. Limiting damage, rescue operations, fire-fighting.
4. Providing radiological protection on the site.
5. Assessing the probable development of events and predicting exposure doses
outside the site.
6. Initiating and applying longer-term protective measures.
7. Adapting and completing the protective measures.
8. Production of data for the retrospectj-ve assessment of the health
consequences.
9. Production of data for scientific and technical studies.
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Sg. (a) Need for multiple control centres 
- communication
control centres must be provided to carry out the following activities:
1. Measures at the install.ation
2. Emergency measures at the site
3' Radiological protection outside the site, including measurement and con-trol of the initial measures.
The essential feature for this control
designed communications system 
- apart from
Conmunity might usefully consider providing
control centres.
60. (b) Protective measures
measures
criteria
system to be effective is a well-
the telephone and radio. The
financial aid for these nultiple
the emergency' plan
o{:her nuclear
The emergency plan must incrude a procedure for deciding whether
need to be taken to protect the public. There must be quantitative
.concerning the imprementation and date of application of the
measuree. ('Emergency reference levelsr in Britain.)
51. (c) Possible action at EuEgpean level
In the case of a very serious nuclear accident,
must provide arrangements for calling in the help of
installatlons and other organizations.
If the state of emergency persists for some
necessary to send out appeals for assistance over
Within the Community there are
frontiers t,o require the conclusion
plans.
time, it may become
a wider area.
reactors sufficiently near, to national
of agreements on transfrontier emergency
-b PE 74.05L/ fln.
o. 9ggggsi gr-!cEesEgb- rs!e_reeg!er_ geEe!y
(a) Pirgsg-reeerreh
62. rhe commission'is devoting a considerable proportion of its
research effort to the problem of reactor safety; about 30E of
the work of the Joint Research centre is concerned with this
subject as part of the 1980-L983 direct action multiannual programme,
to which must be added an indirect action progranme over 5 years,(1979-1983) at a totar cost of the order of 6 milrion ECU. This
represents some 20t of the total funds spent on reactor safety
research in the community i.e. including national progranmes.
63..Nuclear safety in generar is a particularly suitable subject for
Community research:
' the probrems are generarly the same i_n all the countries of
the community and common solutions enhanced by the diversity
of approach must be found, especially as such common sol.utions
would help in the harmonization of safety measures taken on the
basis of the research results;
- research in this field is often very expensive and requires huge
experimentar installations which there is no point in duplicating.
The community approach should alIow coordi_nation of effort and
pooling of resources, leading to concentration of the most
costly work around a few central installations, particularly
the Joint Research Centrei
- since the commission is not bound to any specific development
in regard to reactors, it can exerc-se great independence ofjudgment in its research into safety and act as a pubrlc service
in this sector.
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64. Research into reactor safety 4i6s €ssentialry at satisfying two
requirements:
- to Provide the designers, manufacturers and operators of reactors withthe information they need to implement measures to ensure the prevention
of accidents and the operationar- reriability of the installatior,s in par-ticular by incorporating safety devices in t,he design of the system
and developing appropriate operating proceduresi
- to provide the competent authorities, in particurar those responsible
for safety licensing, with the toors to make a detailed assessment ofthe safety leve1 of the instalrations submitted for their examination.
' while the resul-ts of this type of research are usual-ly not immediately
comprehensible to the general public, they nevertheless provide infor-
rnation for experts and poriticians who in turn can educate pubJ-ic opinion.
65. lJhile it is possible to make this distinction 1n the aims of the
research, the same cLear distinction is scarcery possible in regard to
the research to be undertaken. Research into accident prevention devicesis indissociable from the studies and simulations of these accidents;
safety devices designed to prevent accidents cannot be correctly designed
unress the accidents which they are designed to prevent are fully under-
stood and, conversely, the studies and accident simulations must takefull account of the safety devices and assess their reliabiJ-ity.
66' community research is concerned both with J-ight water reactors,, which
are the type most used in the Community's power stations, and fast breeder
reactors where the emphasis is on riquid-metar-coored reactors. ,No specific
studies are devoted to either gas-cooled reactors or heavy $rater reactors.
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57. The programmes include both theoretical work (analysis of mathematical
modeSs, development of design codes; statistical studies) and experimental
studies (from the simple laboratory rig to the reactor used specially for
a single simulation experiment).
68. In general the research can be divided into three categorles!
- theoretical and experimental- study of events initiating a potential
accident and the consequences of such an accident:
69. This category includes the major projects associated with the loss of
coolant accident in light-water reactors such as Super SARA and LOBI, the
study of fuel-coolant interactions, and, for fast breeder reactors, the
work on heat removal folLowing a core meltdown (PAHR project) and the
studies on the release and possible dispersion of fission products following
an accident;
- study of the preventive measures and possibility of early detection of
possible faults or fractures:
This includes work on dxamination of the integrity of steel components
of.large cross section (PISC programme) and studies on the mechanics of
fracture of structural materials.
- general analysis of safety concepts, in particular a sunmary 'and com-
parison of methods of risk assessment. The establishment of a European
Reliability Data Store (ERDS) forms part of this work.
70. While in the past the emphasis at Comrnunity leve1 has been above all
on accident studies - which continue to occupy an important place
justified by the complexity of the phenomena examined - since the Three
Mile Island accident, in particular, increased attention has been given
to the two other categories of research, the'methodological problems of
analysrng the safety characteristics of reactors and assessment of the
reliability of nuclear components. Without claiming that the progranme
is absolutely complete or cannot be amended to adjust the relative impor-
tance given to differenE subjects, it can nevertheless be claimed that it
adeguately covers the most importanL aspects of the problems raised by
reactor safety. Perhaps governments and the Commission might Pay greater
a--tanf-ion t-o the reliability of this research since only nrogresFl
in rhis field wilt alIow nuclear options to be selected without reEistance
from the public,whether this is justified or ortherwise.
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(b) Indirect research
7 r . Ile-ptegreEEe!-!9-ee9rg]!ele-tesesrg!-!y-!be-UeE!et-g!e!es-qe_er]e!
but are disappointing and still display a Lack of comprementarity. The
Community objective is to irnprove the systematic exchange of information
and cooperation between specialist instituEes thus avoiding unnecessary du-
plication of effort and to encourage where appropriate the development
of joint programmes. But a lack of resources and political wi1l have
largely thwarted attainment of the original goa1.
72. Apart from the periodic updating and publication of an index showing
all the research projects in this field in progress in the Community,
there is currently a 1ive1y exchange of views and information on topical-
issues such as:
- the production of hydrogen following a loss of primary coolant
accident and the possibJ,e risk of explosion in the containment vessel;
- interaction between man and machine;
- alternative containment design;
- steel components in water reactor power stations.
73. One major result of this concerted action was the launching in March 1979
of an 1ggi5gg!-999p9!i!y_I9ggg59b-plggrgEgg_9!-gg!95_I9eglgf_Eelgly the purpose
of which is to contribute to the efforts in progress in the Memben States
and the Joint Research Centre by concentrating attention on certain com-
plementary aspects; to bring together a major part of the work done
in these fields; to prepare for harmonization of criteria and measures
applicable when granting approval for power stations.
74. The areas covered by this progralnme are:
- thermohydraulics of rewetting and reflooding the core of the power
station following a loss of primary coolant accident;
- protection of reactors against explosions of hydrocarbons released in
the proximity (for example following a transport accident);
- release and atmospheric dispersion of active fission products following
a reactor accident.
It is too early to assess the results of this programme yet.
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IV . DECOT4MISSIONING OF NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS
75. At the moment Community action in the field of decommissioning nuclear
power stations is timited to the research aspect of the second environmental
programme and is being carried out in the form of a L979-1989 research
and develoPment Programme'
(a) assess the foreseeable quantities of'radioactive waste of various
categories arising from the decommissioning of nuclear installations;
(b) compare the specialist techniques in exlstence or being developed in
the field of decommissioning, with a view to assessing them both in
terms of the protection of man and the environment and their economy
and on the basis of this assessment, decide on the action to be taken;
(c) compare the available studies and experience of decommissioning opera-
tions and the various foreseeable methods of disposal of the radio-
active waste resulting from these operations;
(d)derivecertai.nguidingprinciplesforthedesignandoperationof
nuclbar installations $rith a view to simplifying their subsequent
decommis s ioning ;
(e)'derive guiding PrinciPlJs for
'tions which might constitute
poticY in this field'
the decommissioning of nuclear installa-
the initial elements of a Coinmunity
77'. The areas covered are:
Long-term integrity of buildings and systems;
Decontaminatj"on with a view to decommissioning;
Dismantf ing techniques i
Treatment of specific waste: steel, concrete and graphite;
Large containers for the transport of radioactive waste from the dis-
mantling of nuclear Power stations;
tsStimation of the quantities.oF radioactive waste arising from the de-
commissioning of nuclear Pohrer stations in Lhe Community;
Influence of design characteristics of nuclear Power stations on de-
commissioning;
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- Derivation of guiding principles for the design and operation of nuclear
power stations with a view to simptifying their subsequent decommissioning
and for the decommissioning of nuclear power stations.
78. The current programme is to be considered as the first stage in a
longer term operation needed to achieve the essential objective referred
to above.
7g. The results of the current programme will, in particular, enable a
better assessment to be made of the radioactivity inventories of the power
stations and possible decommissioning techniques. Certain measures under
this progrannme, such as the estimation of the quantities of radioactive
waste produced and the derivation of guiding principles, should acquire
greater importance under a second Programme.
BO. In addition to the laboratory work and theoretical studies which
constitute the major part of the current programme, large-scale operations
Should be carried out when a station is decommissioned, including the
testing of new techniques for the extension of proven techniques to more
difficult conditions, such as the dimensions and radiation 1evel of the
components. The Adv.isory Committee on Programme Management responsible
for the prograrnme has already unanimously expressed an interest in principle
in the extension of Community action 1n this direction. It is however stilL
uncertain as to when such operations, which are subject to various congtraints
(availability of a store for the radioactive waste produced, licensing, etc.),
can be carried out.
81. Since this is a completely new programme which began relatively
recently (the first research contracts were concluded in the second half
of 1980), it is too soon to assess the results.
82. A11 the seven research projects have now been started. The detailed
definition of the work, to which groups of specialists have contributed as
well as the Advisory Committee, has increased the understanding of the
problems raised by the deconmissioning of nuclear Power stations and made
possible an exchange of views betvreen the experts of the various Member
States. The vaLue of the prograrnme is illustrated by the fact that it was
only possible to award contracts for one third of the research proposals
submitted to the Commission with the financial resources available.
The delegation of an expert to the Three Mile Island station in the
United States has provided valuable information on the special de-
commissioning problems raised by a heavily contaminated station following
an accident.
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V - SAFETY OF THE FUEL CYCLE
83. Stricly speaking the safety of the fuel cycle does not fall within
the terms of reference of this report. But given its fundamental importanee
and the concern among a large section of public opinion on the permanent
nature of the waste problem, we considered that an analysis vras necessary.
This shows that the Community has failed to take concrete action to deal
with these crucial problems particularly that of 1ow-Ievel waste which
is produced in large amounts and has a very long 1ife, i-n connection with
the plutonium cycle and its safety. We regret t.hat the R & D prograrnme
presented in May L979 to the Commission has ceased to exist.
It is also regrettable that the safety aspect of reprocessing was not
studied more thoroughly before investments \.rere made in this sphere.
A rational approach would have been less expensive.
A - Ue!sseses!-esq-E!er3ge-9E-rc9lecs!iye-ses!e
84. Since about the middle of the 70s the Community has been undertaking
considerable research into the management and storage of radioactive waste.
The main purpose of this work is to find effective solutions to ensure
protection of man and the environment against the potential risks associated
rvith radioactive waste.
85. Community research in this field began in 1973 as part of two
progranrmes:
- the direct action of the Joint
materialsr (1980-1983): and
- the indirect action progranune:
waste' (1980-1984).
Research Centre: rSavety of nuclear
rManagement and treatment of radioactive
86. The current JRC research activities are basically directed towards
the long-term safety aspects of radioactive waste management. The two main
objectives of the programme are as follows:
4asessment of the long
This includes developing and testing models to evaluate the safety of
geological disposal and related experimental studies on the long-term
stability of treated waste and the confinement of radionuclides in
geological formations.
Optimi.zati.on of alpha waste. rnanagement
This includes optimization studies on alpha waste management taking into
account safety and cost factors and experimental studies on the separation
of plutonium from effluents and measurement of plutonium content by
nondestructive techniques.
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87. The research fields covered by the first five_year1979) of the Community carried out under contracts with
research centres and organizations in the Member states
progranme (L975-
Iaboratories,
vrere as follows:
processing and treatment of waste to ensure safety ln handling andstorage,
interim and final storage,
studies in relation to risks, regulations, responsibirities and costs.
88,. The second.five-year research programme (1980-1984) currently in
progress represents the J.ogicat extension of the first Progranme, but
differs from it in the following ways:
- 
greater attention has been paid to low-and medium-astivity lraste management
to take account of the growing outPut of this type of waste,
- the study of waste disposal in deep-Iying continental formations has
been extended to the seabed,
- 
greater attention has been given to management strategy and safety
studies.
-Bg'. During the impS-ementation of the Programme, research groups have been
formed to discuss the various tecbhological developments and select the
most promising and the most reIiable. Bilateral cooperation between
member countries has also been fostered'
.gO'. 
. The Community prograrnme today represents the only coordinated inter-
nationat effort on this scale, rePresenting about 252 of the R & D
projects of the tltember States and offering third countries useful Pros-
pects for cooPeration-
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91. tn such a field, continuity of the R & D effort over a sufficiently
Iong period in order to arrive at reasonable, i-f not optimum, solutions
and putting this effort into perspective within the wider framework of
safety, industrial development and accePtance of nuclear energy €rre more
important than the size of the financial effort alone.
92. The research Programme therefore forms part of a more qeneral l2-year
lan of action ftL980-L992) on !h9 nt and istor of radioactive
waste approved by the council on 18 February 1980 (oJ No.
29 February 1980).
The imPlementation of :he PIan
meeting of the committee of experts
in preparation-
C5lof
began in November 1980 with the first
responsible; a rePort on point (1) is
'93. This plan of action comprises five poirits:
(l) Continuous comparj-son of the techniques, practices and installations
already in existenoe or.'planned by the Member states, with the
nuclear programme requirements and the timetable; this should make
it possible to ensure that the necessary solutions are available in
good time
(2) Conmunity consultation in regard to the permanent storage of waste,
i.e. the enlargement to the national progralnmes of community
. acti.on hitherto limited to the commissionts R & D PrograEne; this
should make it possible to optimize the arrangements for Permanent
storage i
(3) Consultation on the practices relating to the management of uraste'
the quantity and properties of treated waste and the oondit-ions
governing the disPosal of waste;
continuity of community research and development work during the PIan;
this should enable research to be carri6d out and provide the solutions
exPectedforthenextdecade,inparticularinregardtopermanent
storage;
(5) Regular inforrnation of the public'
(4)
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g4., Brief mention may now be made of the main technical and scientific
results obtained so far under the research progranmes:
- commissioning (April Lg79) of an industrial pilotp,lant using a new
process for coating the waste from a nuclear pow6r station (SENA) in
thermosetting resins providing good resistance to mechanical, chemical,
bacteriological effects and fire;
- examination in three research centres (B, D, F) of various processes for
the treatment of cladding waste and determination of the radioactivity
associated with such waste (UK, Conmission), with a view to a later
comparison and possibly selection;
- active experiments in the laboratory on a process for treating various
waste containing alpha emitters (D);
- examination of three different processes for burning combustible waste
contaminated by pJ-utonium and other alpha emmiters (B, F, D) and examina-
tion of the possibilities for recovery of the plutonium contained in the
waste. An industrial scale incinerator for slightly contaminated
waste has been started up in active operation. This type of treatment
produces a reduction in volume of 958 together with.irnmobilization of the
contaminated centres in stable slag. The two ot.her processes, combustion
in molten saLt and acid digestion will allow almost all the plutonium
contained in the waste to be recovered;
- cooperation between the united Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
(Harwe1l, UK), the Hahn-I'leitner Institute (D) and the Commissariat i
I'Energies Atomique (F) to evaluate and compare under identical con-
ditions the properties of highly active waste vitrified according to
the processes being developed in these three countrj-es; the first re-
sults show that an alpha._radiation dose equivalent to that receiv6rd by
the vitrified products in lOO,OOO years' sLorage increases their
leaching rate by only a factor of 2. Deterioration in the glass due
to'devitrification at high temperature was not found below 700oC'
Withtheexceptionofonetypeofglass,allthesampleskeptat
SOOoC for one hundred day6 maintained their resistance to devitrifica-
tion i
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- 
r-he preliminary results on methods of storage and/or disposal of radio-
active krypt.on after separation of gaseous waste (8, D, NL, UK). These
methods may be of rlse when the nuclear industry has reached a stage
at which the present procedure for discharge via a stack is cdlled
into question;
-'experiments in two detritiation pilot units on two methods of
separating tritium from liquid waste from the fuel reprocessing
plant using differem catalysts (D, B);
- a study of the possibility of using Iow-melting-point glass for
fixing iodine (F);
- the acquisition of considerable data on the characteristics of rocks
and typical geological strata as part of a coordinated progralnme
(study of salt formations: D, NL; ci.ay formations: B, I;
granite formations: F, UK); results have been obtained both in the
laboratory and on site, despite the delays due to external causes in
the latter casei
: the technological reliability of waste disposal in appropriate geologi-
caI formations has been confirmed and 6esign Etudies of under-
ground storage installations in clay and granite have been carried out
by specialist firms with the support of the appropriate national
laboratories i
- the mechanisms of migration of important radioelements in the geosphere
have been analysed and a series of artificial barriers to prevent such
migration have been examined;
- the most important factors which might compromise the safety of such
storage installations have been identified for each tylpical geological
formation;
- 
r-he lega1, financial and administrative measures connected with the
managernent of radioactive waste and in force or projected in the
Member States have been listed and outstanding guestions identified.
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rn an earlier JRC programme, considerable efforts were devoted to
evaruating the waste management strategy based on chemicar separation
and the transmutation of actinides.
- l4ethods have been developed to evaluate the long-term risks of
radioactive waste storage in georogical formations. The model is
based on a probabilistic analysis of geological disturbances in the
storage sites, such as faults, magmatic activity, glacial phenomena,
etc. and on a determinist analysis of the consequences of possibre
disturbances, taking into account the properties of the treated waste,
the geological and hydrological features of the sites, etc. The
varidity of these methods was shown by their application to the clay
formation at Boom (Belgium), a possible future storage site. The
results show that the probability of any weakening in the geol0gical
barrier in the clay formation is sufficiently small to ensure a large
safety margin.
- studies on other strategies of the fuel cycle have also shown that
the long-term risks associated with the storage of irradiated, non-
reprocessed fuels are one order, of magnitude higher than for the
recycling of uranium and plutonium.
On the other hand if waste should be
of years, the dosages involved would
the least favourable circumstances.
released after several thousands
be extremely low, even under
- The commission has been chosen by the oECD Nuclear Energy Agency as
the executive organization for studies on the chemical separation and
transmutation of actinides. Comrnunity research in this field has been
completed and shows that. the separation and transmutation of actinides
wourd be technologically feasibl-e if a major research and development
effort were undertaken. But, this waste management strategy does not
reduce the long-term risks sufficiently to justify new research in
this field.
- The development of non-destructive methods and instruments
measuring the leve1 of plutonium in radioactive wastes has
to the airns of ensuring the safety of. fissire materiars. A
of the techniques has been published and experimental work
in nuclear installations in the Community.
for
contributed
Conpendium
is going on
- 
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95.As regards collaboration with third countries and organizations, an
agreement on the disposal of waste in a granite formation was signed
with canada on 2 November 1980. Another collaboration agreement is
being negotiated with the United States.
96.Permanent links for collaboration have also been established with the
oECD Nucrear Energy Agency and the rnternational Atomic Energy Agency
in Vienna.
B PLut,onium tesrs]1Es-3!g-repreeee e+!g-e!- irregic!gg_EgeIl
97. During the period L975 Eo 1979 the commission contracted out a
research prograrnme on plutonium recycling in light vrater reactors, the
main purpose of which was to help to ensure that the deveropment of
the plutonium industry was compatibre with the requirements of safety
and protection of the environment.
98. The principar subjects covered by this progranme were as follows:
- study of the general problems associated with the use of prutonium,
- research to fill certain gaps in the scientific and technical
information rerating to plutonium recycling in light water reactors.
99. The most important results obtained include the forrowing:
- the rate of plutonium recycling which a light water station can acc ept
without changes to the control systems depends on the design of the
station and the degree of optimization in the refuelring. At reast
308 of the fuel for each station considered can conprise plutonium
assemblies (the rest being uranium) without change to the control
devices;
- prutonium recycling in light water stations does not cause any
appreciable changes compared with the uranium cycr6 as regards the
effect on the environment;
the plutonium resulting from the first recycling (second generation
plutonium)can be transported in existing containers, while .respecting
the radiorogicar exposure rimits for workers laid down by the basic
Euratom standards orr radiological protecti.on.
100. A second R & D prograrnme (1980-1984) on the 'plutonium cycle
and its safety' ldas proposed by the commission to the council in
March !-979 but was rejected.
101' The Council adopted insteacl on 18 February 1980 a resolution on
the reproceesing of irradiated nuclear fuels and decided on the same
committee on this subiect.date to set up an ad hoc advi
- 42 - PE 74.O5Vfin.
10?' the functions of this committee are to!
(1) analyse the reprocessing situation in the Community' both as regards
changingneedsandthe&vailablecapacity,andtocarryoutacomp1ete
,surveyithisanalysiswilttakedueaccountofLheworkalready
done;
(2) gather information on the interim
medium-term reProcessing of fuel
arising;
(3)considertheadvisabilityandthemean5ofpromotingthedeveJ"opment
of the necessary industrial capacity in the Community and to
faciritatecoordinationofinitiativesbetweenthelartne-rsconcerned'
havingregardtothelegatandindustrialarrangementgalreadyset
upt
(4)consider,asregardsindustrialreprocessingcapacity'theadvisabitity
and possibility of using all the pertinent provisions of the Euratom
Treatylinparticularwithaviewtofacilitatingconvergenceofthe
interests of Promoters and users'
los.ArePortbythecommitteeontheseproblemswillbesubmittedtothe
CommissioninlgSl.ThelatterwillforwardittotheCouncilwithits
proposals for action, if anY'
vI.NATIoNALsTRUcTUREsFoRTHEcoNTRoLoFNUCI.EARACTIVITIES
104. The Community institutions should not be involved in licensj-ng
the construction and operation of ,power stations nor in monitoring
andcontroJ.duringoperation,whichshou]"dremaintheresponsibility
of Member States.
However, the national institutions responsible in the llember States
for safety and licensing controls etc. must be compretely independent
ofthebodiesresponsibleforelectricityproductionandtheresearch
centres involved in promoting nuclear energy'
storage caPacitY needed Pending
elements and to review the problems
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The IAEA Code of Good practlce No. 50 C-G recgrnmenos t,ne seEtlng uP
of a safety regulatory body closely linked to government authorities
and responsible for the acceptance, safety analysls and rnonitoring the
constructj-on and operation of installatlons.
In a report to Parliament, the Commieslon should assess the various
institutions in the different Member States and establish to what extent
they comply with the most widespread practices in the Community and the
IAEA No. 50 C-G recommendati-ons-
Safety measures and provisions need to be monitored. The problem
therefore arises of the resources available to the Comrtunity and the
public authorities to monitor safety in the nuclear industry.
In this report, the Commisslon should conslder the advisabllity of
establishing Community standarde.
AIl the Member States should set up public lnstltutions resPonsible
for analysing preliminary and flnal safety reports before issuing buildlng
and operation licenses, and for monitorlng construction and operatlon.
Tbese institutions, answerable to the Mlnlsters responslble, would be
assisted by advisory councj-Is in whlch, In addition to scientists, the
professional and trade union organlzations affected by the implenentatlon
of the safety measures would be represent,ed.
For each nuclear installatlon, a periodlc rePort on the application
of the safety measures and any difficulties encountered should be drawn up
and submitted, to the responsible authoritles and to the councils assistlng
the nuclear plant safety instltutlons.
VII - INSURANCE
109, The Commission considers that all the Member States of the
European Community who have not yet done so must ratify t,he Paris
Convention of 30 July 1950 on civil liability in the field of nuclear
energy, and the additional Brussels Convention of 31 January 1963, and
apply them uniformly. To this end, the Commission has exar,rined in
detail the application of the conventions with government exPerts at tvro
meetings, on 4 February 1975 and 25 Septembet L975, when Lhe Commission
recommendations 65/A2/F,URATOM of 28 November 1955 and 66/22/EURATOM of
5 July 1966 were discussed.
Changes to the specified amounts require revision of the above-
nentloned Conventions. The Commission should therefore play a more
astive role 1n the OECD working partles responsible for this revision-
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VTTT . INTERNAI WORI(ING OI'THE COMMISSION - STAI'F AI{D FINANCIAI, NEEDS
105. The importance of safety policy which has been illustrated above
necessarily has implicatlons in terms of the commission resources
needed. The Commission cannot perfom lts new harmonizing role properly
wlthout resources and ln partlcular staff resources.
It ls not for Parllament to make proposals on the lnternal organiza-
tion of the Commission. This would lnfringe the basic lnstitutlonal
rules but at thls stage it can suggest a few general guidellnes :
1. Genuine coordlnation of servlces rather than dlspersioni
2. Parliamentrs refusal to accept a cutback in the services responsible
for rad.iological protection because these lnvolve obligatlons
incumbent on the Cornmission under the Treaty;
3. The nuclear safety services should be expanded to enabte thern to
operate effectively.
IX . CONCLUSIONS
107. The rapporteur considers that several proposals contained in this
explanatory statement could be examined by the Commlssion.
( 1 ) Directive on basic standards
The directive of L5.7 .1980 should be revised and extended to include
the objectives set out in ICRP publication 26. (see 5 ff). Studies should
be instituted to design special instruments, in particular for casual
workers, occupational illnesses, the dosage for pregnant women, population
dosage monitoring and sections a and b of ArticLe 6 (optimization). In
section II1, Article 31 (Recording of results) there should be provision
for establishing a complete operational data bank to permit the extremely
long-term epidemological studies required for low doses of radiation.
This data bank should be one of the main elements supplying information to
the overall information and control service, with data on physical safety
as the other main element. The Comrnission must also ensure that this
directive is updated whenever this is made necessary by scientific discoveries
(e.9. radiation in prefabricated construction materials).
Consultation with the organizations representing the workers should be
generally extended, includ,=d in the texts and incorporated into the ICRP 26
objectives.
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(2) Disposal of radioactive waste
108. In the context of Article 37 of the EURATOM Treaty, the Commission
should :
seek to amend as soon as Srosslb1e the recormnendation of 16 Novernber l9G0
along the lines proposed by the expert group and in particuJ-ar
revise the form and content of the d,ocrurents to be supplied under
Article 37,
extend obligatory community consultatlon on the disposal of radlo-
active waste to all nuclear installat,lons in the Menber States
incorporating a general approach to the disposal of waste from
smalI installatlons,
ensure that for larger installations this procedure takes effect before
building permission is given at a date well before implement,ation of the
project, particuJ-ar1y when the installations are located near frontiers,
monitor the lmprementatlon of the recorunendations in the opinlons
which it submits and to report on this to the Member States concerned,
encourage the formuration of standardized methods of calcuratlng
the radiological consequences of waste disposar both for normal and
accidental dlsposar and :rccord these methods the status of European
standards or reconmendat:.ons based on clearry-deflned treference
accidents ! ,
pursue unremj-ttingly its efforts to obtain the documents requlred,
withj.n the prescribed d,eadline (certain countrles only submlt their
docunents once work on the lnstallatlon is wel-r under way) and report
to Parliarnent on any failure to observe deadlines,
instruct the European informatlon and control servj.ce (see paragraph 8)
to supply the expert group wlth all the information they need for
their work, lncludlng transfrontier emergency plans,
ensure that the above proposals on the information to be supplied
are not clrcumvented by clalme that the infornation j-s classlfled.
introduce thls procedure before bulldlng permlsslon is given
by the Member State and not slnply before implementation of the project.
rt is wrong that certain states, such as Belgium, should contlnue to
give building permission without reference to the safety analysis,
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- 
extend consultation to include aspects not at present covered by
Article 37 such as themal discharge. In this connection the tmplementa-
tion of the conclusions of the report by Mrs Von ALEITIANN on the esLablish-
ment of a Comunity consultation procedure for power stations likely to
affect the territory of another Member state is a matter of urgency.
3- European control over the application of basic standard.s must be
increased and, haraonization of the measurement and control procedures and of
installations must be updated to take account of developments in the
nuclear network.
4- As regards the safety of water reactors, we uust now await specific
recorrmendations under Article L24 of the EURAToM Treaty. parliament
takes the vlew that less time should be spent elaborating general principles
now that the document on safety principles has been adopted. On such
general Eatters, it will oftr:n be enough to refer to the IAEA codes of
good practlce in the fotmular:j-on of whi<:h the Member States were dlrectly
or indirectly involved. we not, need sp(:ciflc European standards which deal
d.irectly wlth details of des'r-gn, constrrrction and operatlon of power stations
with water reactors and their comtrrcnents.
These specific Community recommendations should soon cover the
following areas, where the work of the working parties is at an advanced
sl:age:
- 
protection of nuclear power stations against failure in the electricity
system
- Protection of nuclear powel: stations
- against aircraft crashes
- against t.he effects of explosions of gas clouds outside
- against floods
- Stsudy of the mechanical an,l thermohldrarilic effects of a loss of
coolant accident (LOCA) on the primary circuit and the containment
vessel, and the radiological effects of a LOCA
- FueI handling accidents
- Pressure vessel of the rear:tor primary circuit
- Containment vessel and protective systems
- Quality control
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5. Although the question of siting was extensively covered in the debate
on the rePort by Mrs von ALEMANN, it is useful to recall that Parliament
wishes to see early progress in this respect both as regards harmonized
siting criteria and the establishment of a consultation and arbitration
procedure. At the minimun, a tgood neighbour code, would undoubtedly
help to achieve such progress if it sought to govern by means of minimal
standards, which the Connission would also have to respect, relations on
these questions which at present are on a birateral, and often unequal
basis
6. Direct and indirect research must be actively promoted. particular
mention must be made of the super-sARA project to which parlia-ment
attaches the greatest importance. The budgetary procedure must not be
parsimonious in this respe,:t. The Super-SARA project must have constant
suPport and a consistent budgetary contribution at all stages. Interested
third countries who are working on nuclear technology could be associated
with it for this purpose.
7. Your rapporteur considers that the Comrnission should ask Member
states to compare their respective emergency plans in order to ensure
that each state has a clear view of all the possibilities, the resources
required, and can correctly assess its needs in this respect. The
commission must provide te<:hnical assi-stance at the highest rever and
alrow progressive upward standardization of the ,emergency reference
Ievels' .
This control network ttnd the necessary infrastructures must also be
given financial priority in each state. The Commission will assist this
new action by giving prior i ty to these infrastructures through the
Regional Fund under its pr('sent criteria, and after it is reformed.
8. L 
_E,{ofgn informatiorr and control service (see diagram attached)
should be set up with the lol1owing functions:
- advising Member States as
pIans,
- listing the capabilities ,
faciLities and specialist
- setting up a central data
nuclear installations and
supply information (draft
to the conclusion of transfrontier emergency
of the various Member States in terms of
medical services for transfrontier intervention,
bank on unusual incidents likely to affect
associated operations with an obligation to
regulation before the Commission) ;
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preparing and coordinating European
serious accident, and in particular
monitoring tge possible application
Article 38 of the EUR.ATO!! Treatyt
assistance in the event of a very
specialist nedical aid;
of the second paragraph of
- coordinating the retrospective assessment of the health consequences
and the scientific and technical studies to be carried out following
major incidents or accjdents.
This European informtrtion and control service would carry out these
duties in addition to those arready referred to in points r and 2 of
the Conclusions. It would thus constitute a genuine operational
information and action service at European level.
9. The time is approach5ng when najor power plant installations will
have to be decommissioned. We must therefore proceed beyond the research
stage and develop technical criteria as a basis for European poricy in
this area. But Parliament takes the view that measures in this field should
not be confined to testing and applying decommissioning techniques. The
cost of these operations should also be taken into account and the Commission
might usefully exploit its powers by starting to consider in depth taking over
these costs and setting up a special fund for the decommissioning of power
stations.
10. As regards the control authorities, as this is a sphere of activity
in which the concept of 'public authorityr is of predominant importance,
every nuclear installation and all activities associated with the fuel
cyc1emustbesubjecttod@bythepub1icauthority,in
particular as regards safety. The Commission should draw up a report
on the application of the IAEA 50 C-G code and in the light of this,
consider whether there is a need for separate Community legislation.
fn addition, having regard to long-term safety requirements, it is
essential that at the presr--nt stage of industrial development, the re-
processing of irradiated frrel and the storage of waste are placed under
direct public responsibilit y for as long as these operations remain
inseparable.
Ll. As regards insurance, the
should be advised to emphasize
of legislation Ermong the Ten by
The OECD should not be allowed
rapporteur considers that the Commission
its active role by applying harmonization
means of a Community instn:ment.
to monopolize this issue.
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(a)
L2. To summarize, Parllamentts resolution is based on the concept of
a unlfied safety zone whlch implies 3
regulatory measures
A full range of Conmunity standards for the protectlon of workers,
the public and the environment against nuclear radiation. Thls
would bring together comprehenslve directives on basic
standards (direct exposure or exPosure from waste) and Conmunlty
lnstruments relating to the prevention of accj-dents and the accidental
release of radioactlve substances or the dismantllng of contamlnated
installations and the treatment and dlsposal of waste.
Reactor safety and safety in other industrial mass processing
installatlons (reprocessing, treatment of waste, fuel production)
will be the major elements involved.
coordi-natlon of adninistrative measures
The requirements on Member States in their threefold task of
authorization, regrulation and monitorj-ng should also be specified
in European directives to ensure that standards are effectlve and
verifi-able :
national licensing procedures should be all-embracing and :over
building permission, permission to oPerate and waste dlsposal;
advance consultatlon with nelghbouring countrles and the Com-
mission needs to be organized;
the national licensing, regulatory, monitoring and assistance
servj-ces should be enabled to carry out a varlety of'tasks
to be defined;
the authorized bodj.es responsible for ongoing survelllance must
be public bodj.es or endowed with a slmilar status; they must
be independ.ent of builders and operators; regional and local
authorities and the trade unlons should be brought together in
a Councll empowered'to investigate and provlde lnfomation on
Lhe actual risks lnvolved and the precautions takeni
(b)
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- there should be an agreement on measures to combat secrecy ( a written
record should be kept of every incident and these should be investigated
by the body responsible for surveillance); Lhe same applies to emergency
reference levels above whlch the natlonal safety organlzation and the
Council of the survelllance body have to be alerted;
- the European data bank should receive a steady flow of computerized
informatlon on waste and waste disposal and on any incidents as they
occur i
- transnational coordination of emergency plans needs to be organized.
(c) tlore research into reactor safety and the fuel cyclei a comparison
of the various systems and varlous methods of treatment or processing
based on the most advanced methods of accident risk analysis.
(d) Instltutional measures
- coordination and strengthening of Commisslon resources;
- the creation of an lnformatlon and control service (data bank,
technj_ca} advice, coordlnation of activities in the event of a
serlous accident).
(e) Financial meaegres
- a specially created fund for the decommissioning of power stationsi
- back-up measures for insurance schemes;
- flnancial support from the Reqional Fund for the investments
needed for the emergency planning.
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ANNEX I
MOTTON FOR A RESOLUTTON (DOCU!{ENT 1-658/80)
tabled by Mr V. MICHEL
pursuant to RuIe 25 of the Rules of
Procedure on nuclear safety policy
The European Parliament,
- having regard to the importance of a coordinated po11cy on nuclear
safety,
- having regard to the need to take concrete measures for the implementa-
tion of the conclusions in the reports drawn up after th€ Harrisburg
inc i dent ,
- having regard to the multiplicity of services dealing with safety
matters and the present fragmentation of Community administration,
which acts as a brake on progress in this field,
- whereas such fragmentation renders any purposeful assessment of the
budgetary needs of nuclear safety policy impossible,
1. Calls on the Commission to malte nuclear safety policy a separate,
comprehensive and integrated policy, under the responsibility of
a single directorate with the independence required to draw up
such a policy;
2. Cal"ls on the Commission to propose measures to monitor the
implernentation of this nuclear safety policy in the real-Iife
situations where problems arise daily;
3. Asks its responsible partiamentary committee to draw up a report
on this subject.
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ANNEX II
r4oTroN FoR A RESOLUTTON (DOCUI4ENT 1-870/80)
tabled by Mr COPPIETERS and Mr CAPANNA
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of procedure
on the nuclear accident in La Hague
The European Parliament,
having regard to Articlr-'33 of the Euratom Treaty, which requires Lhe
l4cmber states to rcspect safety standards for the protection of the
public,
having regard to Article 39(5) of Directive 76/579 of 1 June Lg76,
which requires the authorities of the Member states to inform the
commission and neighbouring countries in the event of an accident
involving exposure of the public to the risk of radiation,
whereas the nuclear waste processing installation at La Hague in France,
which reprocesses the nuclear waste from power stations in several
Member states under contract and is to extract, the plut.onium required
for the operation and annual refuelling of the Super phenix fast-breeder
reactor at creys ir1alvilre, which is financed jointly by France, the
Federal Repubric of Germany, Belgiun, rtary and the united Kingdom,
is a key factor in the Communityrs nuclear strategy,
concerned at the series of accidents which have occured at La Hague
in recent months, in particular the incident of G January r9g1, which,
according to the information available, ted to a leak of radiation at
the site far exceeding the maximum permissible Ieve1 and contaminated
the surrounding area,
aware of t.he difficurties involved in the industrial apprication of
uranium oxide waste reprocessing,
CALLS ON the Commission of the European Communities:
1. to urqe the French authorities
tlit. Pr6yi.si<tn of information on
to respect their obligations regarding
nuclear accident.s;
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2. to organize as a matt-er of urgency. in conjunction with the French
aut.horities, an independent inquiry into the short- and long-term
effects of the accident of 6 January at La Hque on the health of
the local population;
3. to present to the European Parliament as soon as possible a general
report on the situation at the inst.allations aL La Hague, notably
as regards:
(1) working conditions;
(2) accidents in 1980 and 1981, their causes and the implications for
the heal-th and safety of the workers and the 1ocal population;
(3) the results of the application of the PUREX procedure for the
reprocessing of uranium oxide wasi:e, the difficulties encountered
and the resulting working conditions;
(4) the potential qrrantities of waste which can be reprocessed
and the amounts of pJ.utonium which can be extractedr particularly
in relation to the commitments entered into with other Community
countries and the credibility of the fast breeder reactor option.
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ANNEX III
MOTTON FOR A RESOLUTTON (DOCUI4ENT 1-913/80)
tabled by I.{r COPPIETERS, I4r CAPANNA, Mr GENDEBIEN,
Mr LYNGE, Mrs MACCHIOCCHI, Ivirs VIEHOFF, Mr BOYES,
Mrs BUCHAN, Mr BALFE, l4r van I4INNEN, Mr SCHWENCKE,
MT VAN IVIIERT, MT COLLA, I{T LINDE, MT MICHEL,
MTs LTZIN, MTS BOSERUP, MTS CLWYD, IVTS CASTELLINA,
Mr PAI,INELLA, Mr BLANEY
with request for urgent debat.e pursuant to
RuLe 14 of the Rules of l)rocedure
on the nuclear accident at LA HAGUE
The European Parliament,
h4ving regard to Article 33 of the Euratom Treaty, which requires the
I.lember States to respect safety standards for the protection of the
public,
having regard to ArEicle 39(5) of Directle 76/579 of I June L976, which
requires the authorities of the l4ember States to inform the Commission
and neighbouring countries in the event of an accident involving
exposure of the public to the risk of radiation,
whereas the nuclear waste processing installation at La Hague in France,
which reprocesses the nucfear waste from power stations in several
I4ember States under contract and extracts the plutonium required for
the operation and annual refuelling of the Super Phenix fast-breeder
re.actor at Creys l/la1vi11e, which is financed joint.ly by France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Italy and the United l(ingdom,
is a key factor in the Community's nuclear strategy,
concerned at the series of accidents which have occurred at La Hague
in recent months, in particular t.he incident of 5 January 1981, which,
according to the information available, Ied to a leak of radiation at.
t.he site far exceeding the maximum permissible level and contaminated
the surrounding area,
aware of the difficulties involved in the industrial application of
uranium oxide waste reprocessing,
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CALLiJ ON THE COM},IISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES :
1. to organize as a matter of urgency, in conjunction with the French
authorities, an independent inqulry into the short- and long-term
effects of the accident of 6 January at La Hague on the health of the
local population;
2- to present to the European Parlj-ament as soon as possible a general
report on the situation at the installations at La Hague, notably
as regards:
(1) working conditions;
(2) accidents in 1980 and 1981, their causes and the implications
for the health and safety of the workers and the local population;
( 3 ) the results of the application of the PUREX procedure for the
reprocessing of uranium oxide waste, the difficulties encountered
and the resulting working conditions;
(4) the potential quantities of waste which can be reprocessed and t.he
amounts of plutonium which can be extrar:ted, particularry in
relation to the commitments entered int<> with other Community
countries and the credibility of the fast-breeder reactor
option.
JUSTIFICATION
The request for urgency is justified in view of the danger
threatening the population of the area around the LA HAGUE installation,
the frequency of accidents and working conditions at the plant.
---oOo---
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